Protect your organization as agent autonomy grows.
Assess how your policies constrain agent access to business systems, how sensitive actions are reviewed, and what evidence is available for investigation.
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Review identity, privileged access, data sharing and the evidence behind enforcement.
Questions for other teams →01What security boundary does this enforce?
The Node governs authenticated calls to connected tools before dispatch. It requires explicit permission and authorized definitions. It does not secure bypass paths, the model itself or a compromised upstream system. Network restrictions and least-privilege tool credentials remain part of the security design.
02How are client permissions enforced?
Each authenticated client is mapped to configured identity and evaluated against local policy. Without a matching allow, the call is denied; a matching deny takes precedence. Definition authorization is a separate requirement, so a broad policy does not authorize an unreviewed tool.
03Where are secrets and sensitive data stored?
Tool credentials and operational records belong to the customer-managed installation. The persistent runtime encrypts stored action payloads and retained results with the installation key. Protect the runtime, database, backups and key together; encryption does not remove administrator trust.
04What data leaves our environment?
Optional remote review sends the selected request context and operator-defined review information to the Center. The account portal is a separate surface and does not receive operational data by default. Review payload selection, redaction, retention and provider arrangements before enabling remote review.
05Can prompt injection override a denial?
Agent instructions cannot grant local policy authority or approve a tool definition. However, an injected prompt can still cause misuse within permissions already granted. Narrow permissions, argument constraints in tools and required review reduce exposure; this is not a promise to eliminate prompt injection.
06How are human privileges separated?
The persistent console has Administrator, Approver and Auditor roles. Administrators configure the installation, approvers decide requests and auditors have read-only redacted access. MFA, enterprise SSO and per-tenant operator role separation are not implemented in the current local unit.
07What happens when authority is revoked?
Changes to operators, credentials or policy affect later authorization checks and can invalidate outstanding approvals. A revocation cannot undo an external action that has already crossed the execution boundary. Test revocation behavior and define upstream incident response for completed effects.
08Can the remote review service execute our tools?
The Service returns a review decision; the customer-operated Node owns tool dispatch and enforces the outcome. Tool credentials remain under customer control. A remote allowance does not replace local authorization, and required review unavailability does not grant permission.
09What audit evidence is available?
The local installation records policy decisions, approval actors and execution outcomes with redacted audit access for auditors. Establish retention, access and backup procedures with the installation owner. Do not assume a certified tamper-proof archive or a turnkey SIEM integration.
10Does this satisfy our compliance requirements?
It can contribute controls and evidence, but no certification or automatic compliance outcome is claimed. Assess it against your own requirements, including identity, retention, supplier review and recovery. Product decisions do not replace your security assessment or legal review.
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